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Abstract
We describe our design and implementation of smartcard integra-
tion with Kerberos V5. Authentication is among the most important
applications for smartcards and is one of the critical requirements for
computer security. By augmenting Kerberos V5 with tamper-resistant
hardware, we enhance the security of Kerberos V5 and oer a potential
\killer application" leading to wider adoption of smartcard technology.
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1 Introduction
Smartcards are a rapidly emerging technology
that have received much attention both from
industry and academia. Smartcards can make
signicant impact on current computer systems
because of their inherent security and mobility.
According to market researcher Dataquest,
the smartcard market will grow from 544 mil-
lion units in 1995 to 3.4 billion units by 2001.
However, the vast majority of smartcards are
used in Europe; 90 percent of worldwide smart-
card shipments went to Europe in 1995. Only
2 percent were shipped to the Americas [4].
Smartcards are not popular in the United
States because there is no \killer application"
for smartcards here. Smartcards were intro-
duced to Europe by government telecommuni-
cations monopolies in the form of phone cards,
but the telecommunications industry in the US
is private and decentralized.
These cultural and economic dierences are
common to other smartcard applications preva-
lent worldwide, such as health care and bank-
ing. In addition, credit cards are more success-
ful in the US than in Europe, in part due to the
prevalence of online verication, which is uni-
versally available in the US. This keeps fraud
rates low { reportedly 0.07% [11] { which allows
card issuers to indemnify customers for any loss
over 50 USD. Consequently, issuers, customers,
and merchants are equipped and satised with
magstripe cards and readers, which feature low
cost and broad familiarity [3].
The information technology business sector
might provide the killer application for the
smartcard industry in the United States be-
cause the demand for secure computer envi-
ronments is huge and growing. There is grow-
ing fear of hackers attacking sensitive informa-
tion on the Internet. Smartcards can provide
a secure authentication system when combined
with sound authentication protocols, and can
signicantly improve computer system security
wherever authentication plays a critical role in
the computer security scheme, i.e., everywhere.
Here at the University of Michigan, smart-
cards are already deployed and used for storing
a small amount of cash. Thus, we have a good
setting for extending the deployment of smart-
cards in the computer environment:
 Students and faculty are familiar with us-
ing smartcards.
 An infrastructure is well established, e.g.,
many vending machines and shops have
smartcard readers.
 There is a serious security problem that
can be solved by integrating smartcards
into the computer environment.
 University technologists, especially at the
Center for Information Technology Inte-
gration (CITI), have skill sets and re-
sources to develop smartcard applications.
The goal of our project is to develop, build,
and deploy a smartcard-integrated computer
environment. We want to provide a smartcard
in everyone's pocket that handles computer
authentication, computer proles, electronic
cash, banking, identication, course registra-
tion, paying rents, submitting resume, copy
machines, etc. [6].
The centrally administered computing envi-
ronment at the University of Michigan is pro-
tected by Kerberos, the most widely used net-
work authentication protocol [21, 13]. Ker-
beros is also key to the security infrastructure
at MIT (where Kerberos was invented), Cor-
nell, Carnegie-Mellon, and Stanford, as well as
in commercial product oerings fromMicrosoft
and Oracle.
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Kerberos suers from some inherent secu-
rity pitfalls, principally its reliance on pass-
words selected by users. In recent years, CITI
sta have used password guessing attacks [6, 7]
on the University of Michigan Kerberos servers
with (disappointing) success, quickly obtaining
thousands of passwords on each occasion. To
improve the security of Kerberos and the in-
frastructure it protects, we intend to replace
passwords with randomly generated Kerberos
keys stored on a smartcard.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. In Section 2, we describe why and
how smartcards can enhance the security of
Kerberos. In Section 3, we explain the pro-
tocol we use to integrate Kerberos with smart-
cards. Section 4 contains implementation de-
tails for those who want to port our program
to other operating systems or to use other types
of smartcards. (Readers who are not interested
in implementation details may want to skip the
section.) Performance is evaluated in Section
5. Section 6 discusses related work and smart-
cards we have examined. Future directions are
described in Section 7, followed by concluding
remarks in Section 8.
2 How can smartcards help
in Kerberos?
Bellovin and Merritt enumerate problems of
Kerberos that \are not solvable without em-
ploying special-purpose hardware, no matter
what the design of the protocol." [2] The prob-
lems are:
 Need for secure encryption device
 Need for secure key storage
 Dictionary attack on passwords
We explain these problems, and describe coun-
termeasures that take advantage of strong se-
curity feature of smartcards.
2.1 Need for external encryption
device
In the Kerberos protocol, a user key, K
u
, is
shared between a user and a Key Distribution
Center (KDC), a trusted third party. K
u
is
derived from a password: a workstation reads
the password from a user, converts it to K
u
,
and uses it to decrypt a ticket granting ticket
(TGT), an initial credential in Kerberos. The
protocol is shown in Figure 1.
password
User
Workstation
Kerberos 
KDC1) username
2) {TGT}
Ku
Ku
Ku
3) Decrypt TGT
Figure 1: Kerberos authentication proto-
col without a smartcard
1) When a user attempts to login to a work-
station, the workstation sends a request to the
KDC. 2) KDC generates a TGT, encrypts it
with K
u
, and sends it back to the workstation.
3) The workstation asks the user for a pass-
word, hashes it into key K
u
, and uses the key
to decrypt the TGT. If the TGT decrypts prop-
erly, the user is authenticated and is allowed to
login.
In this protocol, K
u
is exposed to two par-
ties, a user and a workstation. A key memo-
rized by a user can be vulnerable because she
can tell it to another person, or an adversary
might \shoulder surf" it when she types it. A
key in a workstation can be vulnerable if the
workstation is not securely protected or cannot
be trusted for other reasons. For example, if
an adversary can scan the entire physical mem-
ory of the workstation, he can obtain the key.
Along the same lines, if someone has admin-
istrative access rights to the workstation, it is
straightforward to install a rogue login program
in the workstation that stores a user's password
in the adversary's directory. (This is called a
Trojan horse attack.)
To solve these problems, it is desirable to de-
crypt the TGT outside a workstation. There-
fore, an external encryption device is required.
2.2 Need for secure key storage
Kerberos stores some keys in computers, e.g.,
session keys in a workstation and user keys in
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KDC. However, typical computers cannot store
information securely. Information in a com-
puter system is stored either in memory or in a
hard disk, but neither is suciently secure. A
secret in a hard disk is hard to protect because:
 A powerful adversary can access (read and
write) it.
 It is usually backed up in mass storage de-
vices, which may lack sucient physical or
cryptographic protection.
A secret in memory is also hard to protect be-
cause :
 Memory can be physically scanned by a
powerful adversary.
 It may be paged out to hard disks, which
can be scanned.
Therefore, secure storage outside a workstation
and KDC is an important goal.
2.3 Dictionary Attack
When a user chooses a poor password, the de-
rived user key K
u
, is subject to a dictionary
attack. Dictionary attack is performed as fol-
lows:
1. Create a list of commonwords, names, etc.
2. Derive keys from the words in the list.
3. Obtain a <plaintext, ciphertext> pair.
4. Decrypt the ciphertext with the derived
keys.
5. If the plaintext is recovered correctly, the
key used for decryption is revealed.
For example, if the password is a short English
word, an adversary can try all English words
in the dictionary and quickly discover the pass-
word.
Kerberos is vulnerable to dictionary attack
because:
1. It is a password-based authentication pro-
tocol.
2. It easily gives up a <plaintext,
ciphertext> pair to the adversary.
Test runs of dictionary attack in the University
of Michigan Kerberos realm have yielded pass-
words for more than 5% of the user accounts,
i.e., over 4,000 accounts [6].
1
To solve problem (2), pre-authentication is
introduced in Kerberos V5. The Kerberos au-
thentication protocol with pre-authentication
is depicted in Figure 2.
password
User
Workstation
Kerberos 
KDC
1) {username,timestamp}
3) {TGT}
Ku
Ku
Ku
Ku
2) CheckKu
4) Decrypt TGT
Figure 2: Kerberos authentication proto-
col with pre-authentication
In this scenario, KDC ensures that the client
knows K
u
before issuing a TGT. 1) When the
client requests the TGT, it sends a username
and a timestamp encrypted with K
u
. 2) If
KDC can successfully decrypt with K
u
and re-
cover the username and a valid timestamp, it is
sure that the client knows K
u
. If not, KDC as-
sumes someone is forging the client to obtain a
<plaintext, ciphertext> pair and rejects the re-
quest. 3) After pre-authentication, KDC sends
TGT encrypted by K
u
to the workstation and
the protocol continues as depicted in Figure 1.
Pre-authentication prevents an adversary
from getting a <plaintext, ciphertext> pair
just by requesting it, and thus raises the bar
of security to the adversary. However, the ad-
versary can still eavesdrop a network to obtain
a <plaintext, ciphertext> pair. Also note that
it is very easy for the adversary to recognize a
plaintext because it includes well known entries
such as a user name and a realm name.
As long as Kerberos uses passwords for se-
cure information, dictionary attack cannot be
solved completely. Therefore, it is desirable
to replace passwords with randomly generated
1
The most common password was \love."
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bits stored in tamper-resistant hardware [17].
A smartcard is an ideal device to solve the
problems outlined here. The countermeasures
are described in the next section.
3 Design
In this section, we describe a method intended
to enhance the security of Kerberos. It takes
advantage of a smartcard to solve the problems
stated in Section 2.
From the discussion in Section 2, our design
goals are:
 Use randomly generated bits for K
u
.
We can prevent dictionary attack by us-
ing a random key instead of a user chosen
password. However, we then require a way
for users to possess their keys, as it is im-
possible (and insecure!) to expect anyone
to remember a random string of any sub-
stantial size.
 Store a user key in a smartcard.
A smartcard can serve as an external
key storage because it is designed to be
tamper-proof with restricted communica-
tion mechanisms.
 Decrypt TGT in a smartcard.
A smartcard can perform decryption as an
external encryption device because it has
DES en(de)cryption mechanisms.
2
 Do not modify KDC.
If KDC must be modied to implement the
smartcard augmentations, then our eorts
will oer enhanced security in our local
Kerberos realm, but nowhere else. We also
want our improvements to enhance the se-
curity of Kerberos realms beyond our ad-
ministrative control.
3.1 Protocol
Figure 3 shows our Kerberos authentication
protocol with a smartcard. Steps 1) and 2)
2
Or claims to. Many smartcards claim to oer DES
but they in fact do not. We discuss this further in
Section 6.2
are identical to the original protocol (Figure 1).
3) When the workstation receives the TGT, it
does not decrypt it by itself. Instead, it sends
the TGT to a smartcard. 4) The smartcard
then decrypts the TGT, and returns the TGT
in plaintext to the workstation. 5) If the work-
station conrms that the decrypted TGT is cor-
rect, the protocol is nished and the user is au-
thenticated. The protocol satises the goals we
stated above; TGT is decrypted in the smart-
card, K
u
never leaves the smartcard, K
u
can
be random bits, and KDC is not modied
3
.
Workstation
Kerberos 
KDC
2) {TGT}
Ku
Ku
4) Decrypt TGT
Ku
User
1) username
3) {TGT}Ku
5) TGT
Figure 3: Kerberos authentication proto-
col with a smartcard
4 Implementation
We implemented the smartcard integrated Ker-
beros protocol described in Section 3. We now
detail the modications we made to the Ker-
beros library, the DES library, and the Ker-
beros client.
TGT decryption is implemented with a
STARCOS version 2.1 smartcard fromGiesecke
& Devrient. This card oers superior perfor-
mance by providing native cipher block chain-
ing (CBC) for long messages. (A Kerberos V5
TGT is over 200 bytes long.) The development
platform is OpenBSD-2.2 on Pentium 133MHz
PC. The code base is Kerberos version 1.0.5
released by MIT.
3
In fact, KDC in Kerberos V5-1.0.5 must be mod-
ied by one line to run the protocol due to a bug in
Kerberos. However, this modication will not be nec-
essary in later version of Kerberos. We discuss it in
Section 4.1.
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4.1 Adding an encryption system
in Kerberos library
Kerberos V5 uses a look-up table to provide for
easy replacement and development of encryp-
tion systems [12]. The look-up table associates
an encryption type to cryptographic functions,
such as encryption, decryption, and checksum
functions, and data structures, such as a key
structure. It is simple to add a new encryption
system entry by adding an entry to the look-up
table.
There are several encryption system types
dened in the RFC[12] and implemented in
Kerberos V5-1.0.5 including:
 NO encryption
 DES in CBC mode with a CRC-32 check-
sum (des-cbc-crc)
 DES in CBC with MD5 (des-cbc-md5)
We created a new encryption system,
DES in CBC with MD5 with a smartcard
(des-cbc-md5-sc). We added a new entry
des-cbc-md5-sc in the look-up table. The en-
try is dened in des md5.c (Figure 4).
krb5_cryptosystem_entry
mit_des_md5_sc_cryptosystem_entry {
EncryptionType ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5_SC;
DecryptionFunc mit_des_md5_sc_decrypt_func();
// Other members are identical to des-cbc-md5
};
Figure 4: Smartcard cryptosystem entry
mit des md5 sc decrypt func() is a new
function that uses a smartcard for decryption.
The other members of the entry are not modi-
ed.
Although the default hash method in Ker-
beros V5-1.0.5 is CRC, implementation of des-
cbc-crc in Kerberos V5-1.0.5 has a bug. In the
Kerberos 5 specication, the initialization vec-
tor (IV) of DES-CBC mode is dened to be 0
[12]. However, des-cbc-crc uses the user key
as the IV. This error can not be xed easily
because Kerberos 5 is already deployed widely.
The G&D smartcard cannot use the key as an
IV without passing it as an argument to the
card, which defeats our goal of eliminating the
key on the workstation.
To our relief, des-cbc-md5 uses 0 as the IV,
complying with the RFC. Rumor has it that the
next version of Kerberos will use des-cbc-md5
by default.
4.2 Modifying DES library
mit des md5 sc decrypt func() calls the
DES CBC encryption function in f cbc.c.
We created a new DES CBC function
mit des cbc sc encrypt() that calls a DES
function in a smartcard instead of a Kerberos
DES library. STARCOS version 2.1 can handle
up to 112 bytes in one command. The TGT,
whose length is approximately 200 bytes,
is divided into two pieces, decrypted in a
smartcard piece by piece, and combined into
one TGT in the workstation.
The specic commands, or APDUs in ISO
7816-4, sent to the smartcard are as follows.
(Readers not familiar with smartcard APDUs
are advised to consult the ISO 7816-4 specica-
tion [8] or Guthery and Jurgensen's book [5].)
 Send \decrypt" APDU with 112 (0x70)
bytes of encrypted data.
0x80 0xf8 0x81 0x81 0x70 data ...
 Send \get response" APDU to upload 112
bytes of plaintext data.
0x00 0xc0 0x00 0x00 0x70
4.3 Modifying kinit
In the authentication function get in tkt(),
an encryption system can be chosen as an ar-
gument. We modied kinit.c so that it does
not request a password from the user, and spec-
ied encryption type des-cbc-md5-sc instead
of des-cbc-md5.
5 Performance Evaluation
Here we evaluate the performance of our Ker-
beros modications.
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5.1 Performance Evaluation
We ran the authentication protocol described
in Section 3.1 by executing the modied kinit
program ve times and logged salient perfor-
mance data. The authentication time uctu-
ates within a relatively small range (1.53 - 1.57
sec.), averaging 1.55 sec. We analyze perfor-
mance in detail in the following sections.
5.2 Time line
Figure 5 shows a time line of one of the ve
trials.
Start
kinit
Reset
Card
(sec)
Start
decryption
End
decrypt
Complete
kinit
0
0.01
0.37 1.47
Start
RPC
Complete
RPC
0.06
0.18
0.31 1.55
Open
File
Figure 5: Time line
Decryption is the obvious bottleneck of the
protocol, taking 1.1 sec., or 70% of the elapsed
time. Decryption is slow { with an 8-bit data
path and a 3.5 MHz clock, a smartcard is much
slower than a workstation. In addition, about
half of the elapsed time is due to the slow (9.6
Kbps) communication with the smartcard.
4
5.3 Breakdown
Table 1 shows how much time is spent in each
part of the protocol. Time is in ms.
part name time (ms) std. deviation
decryption 823 0.754
(non comm part) 498 0.0219
(comm part) 325 0.766
get response 304 0.0459
card reset + open le 245 0.00340
RPC 59.8 9.65
pre-processing 6.19 0.0583
post-processing 83.3 4.80
total 1521 8.76
Table 1: Authentication time breakdown
The decryption step is separable into two
parts: the time to send the encrypted ticket to
4
Many smartcards can be congured to communi-
cate at higher speeds, up to 115 Kbps.
the smartcard, and the actual decryption time.
Get response reads plaintext from a smartcard.
Open le is required to select a key le. RPC
time is for communication with KDC.
Total time to authenticate is 1.52 sec.
Smartcard-related tasks { initialization, com-
munication, and decryption { dominate, taking
1.37 sec. The rest of time, including RPC com-
munication with KDC, is 0.15 sec. Of the 1.37
sec. of smartcard time, communication takes
0.629 sec., decryption takes 0.498 sec., and ini-
tialization takes 0.245 sec. Communication is
the bottleneck; we anticipate improving perfor-
mance by communicating at higher date rates.
6 Discussion
6.1 Related Work
Here we relate this eort to secure computer
systems, secure bootstrapping, smartcard au-
thentication, and smartcard integration with
Kerberos.
Secure computer system
We refer to two eorts with our goal in com-
mon, a secure computer environment.
In their paper \Dyad: A System for Using
Physically Secure Coprocessors", Tygar and
Yee describe their secure hardware and oper-
ating system in small computer systems (i.e.,
workstations and PCs) [22]. They build a co-
processor that is physically tamper-proof and
has the ability to process and store secrets. The
coprocessor provides 1) secure bootstrapping,
2) secure logging, and 3) copy protection. They
build an operating system called Dyad to op-
erate on a secure coprocessor.
Their approach is top-down: unlike most se-
curity protocols, they do not assume security
of low level components of computers such as
operating systems, because an adversary can
reload the kernel. To solve this problem, they
build special purpose hardware, and build oper-
ating systems around it. This approach diers
from ours, as we will explain.
Another related eort is described in \Au-
thentication in Distributed Systems: Theory
and Practice", by Butler Lampson et. al. [14].
They develop a theory of authentication for
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distributed systems based on an access con-
trol model. They build tools necessary for se-
cure systems, such as encrypted channels, boot
strapping, naming, and program loading. Ac-
companying the design of these tools are for-
mal proofs of their security. Finally, they build
an operating system to take advantage of the
tools.
Their approach is also a top-down approach.
They rst design the authentication theory,
and build an operating system based on the
theory, then prove it secure through the design
process.
Both Dyad and TAOS take top-down ap-
proaches: they start with a well-developed the-
oretical framework, then design secure hard-
ware to support the theory, then build oper-
ating systems based on them.
Although these approaches are substantive
and technically sound, they are not practical
for most existing computer environment be-
cause they build new operating systems from
scratch. We take a more pragmatic and exper-
imental approach and build from the bottom-
up for rapid implementation and deployment.
We employ currently available, secure, inexpen-
sive hardware in the form of commercial smart-
cards, integrate them with prevalent standards,
and t them { eortlessly { into our existing
computer environment.
A disadvantage of our approach is that we
still rely on the security of hardware and op-
erating systems, of which we cannot be sure.
(Often, we have great doubts!) For example, if
an operating system is completely replaced, it
is quite possible for an adversary to use stolen
credentials to access resources.
Our solution to this problem is to store all
critical secrets in a smartcard. A smartcard is
tamper-resistant hardware, so no matter what
happens to the hardware and the operating sys-
tem, we can be condent that the secrets in
the smartcard remain safe. In the previous ex-
ample, even if the operating system is compro-
mised, critical information in a smartcard, such
as authentication keys, can not be accessed by
the adversary. Therefore, our approach signi-
cantly \raises the bar" of security in a computer
system with relatively small cost.
Secure Bootstrap
In their paper \A Secure and Reliable Boot-
strap Architecture", Arbaugh et. al. introduce
AEGIS, a secure bootstrap process [1]. They
add a small PROM to commodity hardware.
The PROM is assumed to be secure, i.e., it is
not replaced by the adversary. The PROM con-
tains execution code to start bootstrapping and
digital signatures. During the bootstrap pro-
cess, all execution code is veried by the digi-
tal signature. At the end of the bootstrap pro-
cess, a commodity operating system, FreeBSD
in their example, starts up. As the execution
code in PROM is trusted and bootstrap pro-
cess is trusted, the operating system is trusted
when it starts.
AEGIS is similar to our approach in the sense
that both try to minimize components that
must be trusted, the added PROM in AEGIS
and the smartcard in our case. Also, both
use commodity hardware and software. AEGIS
and our approach complement one another be-
cause AEGIS aims at starting an operating sys-
tem securely, and we aim at establishing a se-
cure computer environment built on top of se-
cure operating systems.
Authentication with Smartcards
Several authentication protocols that use
smartcards have been proposed. For exam-
ple, Rubin proposes one-time password [18],
Shoup and Rubin propose session key distribu-
tion in the third-party setting [20], Leach pro-
poses the use of zero knowledge authentication
[15], and Wang and Chang propose use of pub-
lic key authentication in smartcards [23]. Each
of these concentrates on one-to-one authentica-
tion, such as when a user logs in to a computer.
This diers from our approach in that we in-
tegrate a smartcard into a standard authenti-
cation protocol already in heavy use. Among
them, only Shoup and Rubin's protocol has ac-
tually been implemented with a smartcard [10].
Smartcard Integration with Kerberos
In their paper \Enhancing SESAME V4 with
Smart Cards", Looi et. al. describe smartcard
integration with SESAME V5, a European im-
plementation of Kerberos V5 [16]. Their ap-
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proach is very similar to ours. They describe
two ways of accomplishing smartcard integra-
tion:
1. Store a user key in a smartcard, load the
key into a workstation, and use it for de-
crypting TGT instead of a derived key
from a password.
2. Decrypt TGT in a smartcard.
Method 1 is not as secure as method 2 be-
cause the user key is loaded in a workstation. If
the workstation is not trusted, the key is vul-
nerable. For example, a Trojan horse attack
can easily obtain the key. Method 2, identical
to our method, had not been implemented at
the time of their writing.
6.2 DES in Smartcards
Many vendors claim that their smartcards sup-
port DES, but we had a very hard time getting
a smartcard that meets our requirements, even
though all we need is pure, unadulterated DES.
Here we list some of the DES-capable smart-
cards that let us down when examined closely:
 Schlumberger CryptoFlex
It seems to have DES, but they do not
open the API, so we are unable to issue
the proper APDUs.
 Schlumberger MultiFlex
Internal authentication command returns
the rst six bytes of the eight bytes of en-
crypted data.
 IBM MFC
The smartcard encrypts a ran-
dom number challenge presented by
SCT CMD AUTHENTICATE command.
 MAOSCO MULTOS
The card supplied with the developer's kit
encrypts with a xed key, 0x41, 0xad,
0x82, 0x23, 0xa9, 0x0b, 0xe2, 0xa1.
According to the manual, \for security
reasons," DES is used with a \known
cryptographic key."
 General Information Systems OSCAR
The DES key is XOR'ed with a random
number before it is used. According to
their e-mail: \The keys are XOR'ed with
a random number for security reasons."
While this may help secure the serial link
between the terminal and the reader, it
makes the card useless for enterprise se-
curity deployment.
 Gemplus GPK
The key size is limited to 40 bit, a aw not
shared by Kerberos.
Eventually found a smartcard that satised
our needs: Giesecke & Devrient STARCOS.
7 Future Direction
Comparison among several smart-
cards
We plan to implement the Kerberos authen-
tication protocol in several smartcards, e.g.
Schlumberger CryptoFlex, IBM MFC, MUL-
TOS, and so on.
5
We expect to nd some dif-
ferences in their performance because:
 Some of the smartcards have DES CBC
mode.
 Some of the smartcards have key schedul-
ing APIs.
 Communication speed diers among
smartcards.
We also expect to nd dierences in user
friendliness and stability among smartcards
and developer's kits.
Kerberos tickets in a smartcard
As we argued in Section 2, it is desirable to
store keys in a smartcard rather than in a work-
station. Therefore, storing session keys in ad-
dition to the user key in a smartcard adds se-
curity to the protocol. If tickets are stored on
a smartcard, it is secure to leave a worksta-
tion to have a cup of coee as long as the user
5
If we receive smartcards with DES. See our discus-
sion in Section 6.2.
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brings the smartcard with her. Although an
adversary can access the console, he cannot ac-
cess resources protected by Kerberos because
he does not have session keys.
Smartcard integration with PAM
and NT-PAM
We will address secure single sign-on. Com-
bined with PAM [19] or Windows NT-PAM [9],
smartcards can provide secure single sign-on [7]
because they can store keys and passwords se-
curely, and can be integrated into existing au-
thentication protocols, as we have shown in this
paper.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we identied certain limitation
of Kerberos and ways that a smartcard can
counter them. We suggested a protocol that
takes advantage of the secure features of a
smartcard to enhance security of Kerberos.
The protocol is implemented with a Giesecke &
Devrient STARCOS smartcard and Kerberos
V5-1.0.5. Performance evaluation shows the
protocol runs reasonably fast.
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